No Fair! Ultimatum Game rejection rates for human-computer interactions

Denise A. Baker
Arizona State University

Sarai Cabrera
Arizona State University

Jilma Joy
Arizona State University

Keywords: ; ; ; ; ; ;

Abstract: Research has demonstrated that in some types of human computer interactions people behave toward an artificially intelligent agent (AIG) as if it had moral agency. Anthropomorphic behaviors such as sparing a computer's "feelings" and holding it morally responsible for cheating have been observed. However, research has not examined human capacity to act against one's own interest as a result of perceived moral agency of an AIG. Using the Ultimatum Game paradigm, this study investigates whether participants who engage in an online chat interaction with a partner whom they believe to be an AIG will reject unfair offers from that AIG at a similar rate as participants who believe their partner to be a human. Using a $10 stake, preliminary data suggest participants would rather lose real money (always offered $2) than allow the AIG to "keep" the remaining $8, even when the artificial nature of the AIG is made highly salient.